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L Introduction
Living the American dream, Mark Gould began his career digging ditches
and now owns Gould Construction in Glenwood Springs, Colorado.' Gould
Construction installs sewer systems, sidewalks, foundations, and waste-water
treatment plants.2 Mr. Gould struggles to employ enough unskilled laborers for
this dirty and back-breaking work without employing unauthorized aliens.
Even Mr. Gould understands: "Every kid coming out of school feels they're
entitled to ajob other than digging a ditch for Gould Construction. And there's
nothing wrong with that. I mean I grew up digging ditches, but the bottom line
is we all want better for our children. 3 Even paying twice the minimum wage,
Gould Construction, like many companies in low-skilled industries, is in
constant search for new workers and worries that the increasingly tough
immigration laws will prevent work completion.4
1. NBC News: The 21st Century Immigrant Story: Illegal Immigrants have Become a
Fixed and Growing Part ofAmerica-Living, Working, and Raising Families in the Shadows
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Imagine Melissa, a lifelong resident of a small midwestern city.5 After
dropping out of high school, Melissa has worked cleaning houses, stocking
stores, and waiting tables for the last twenty years.6 Life is an ongoing struggle
to make ends meet despite receiving an hourly wage well above minimum
wage.7 An increase of a mere dollar an hour would raise her annual income by
at least $2,000 a year.8
Then there is Veronica Rodriguez Prez, a U.S. citizen who works on a
production line at the Swift beef processing plant in Greeley, Colorado. 9
During the workplace raids targeting six Swift & Company meat processing
plants across the country, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
arrested and took into custody her husband, Roberto Perez Garcia, who is in the
United States illegally.' Veronica worried about their future, as well as the
fate of their six-month-old Colorado-born son. She was also angry at the way
ICE officials treated them: "They made him and myself seem like criminals.
He tried to give me a kiss on the forehead, but they would not let us talk to each
other.""1
In low-skilled industries, both the employers' and the legal employees'
difficulties arise from the supply and demand of unskilled labor. Although the
employee is easier to empathize with on a personal level, the low-skilled
industries produce many of the goods and services that are central to the U.S.
economy and create jobs that everyone is qualified to fill. The U.S.
government therefore struggles to balance the competition of a global market,
the needs of the country's poorest citizens, and the political consequences of
immigration enforcement.
Private enforcement of immigration laws creates implementation without
government officials suffering the political wrath of competing interest groups.
As of late, the civil Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act,
12
5. For similar stories, see BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT)
GETTING By IN AMERICA 154 (2001).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. S. DEMOCRATIC STAFF ON THE COMM. FOR HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, 109TH
CONG., THEIR FAIR SHARE: CREATING A JUST ECONOMY FOR MINIMUM WAGE FAMILIES 5-6
(Comm. Print 2006), http://www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/livingwages/upload/TheirFair_
Share.pdf.
9. Julia Preston, Immigrants' Families Figuring Out What to Do After Federal Raids,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at Al.
10. See id. (detailing the Perez's story); see also Julia Preston, U.S. Raids 6 Meat Plants
in ID Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at Al (describing six national workplace raids).
11. Preston, supra note 9, at Al.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000).
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traditionally a method to fight organized crime, has emerged as the private
method of choice for employees to force employers to face the
consequences of knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens.13 It does so,
however, by embracing a theory of causation that is tenuous, without a
limiting principle, and, recently, inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent.' 4  Although the lower courts have not yet embraced this
narrowing of standing, 5 bringing suits that are contrary to Supreme Court
precedent is an inefficient and undesirable method of enforcing
immigration law. Nonetheless, the "private attorney general" vision of
RICO enforcement is not without some advantages, and with proper
congressional legislation, the strengths of civil RICO can be maintained
without RICO's threat of treble damages or the stigma of suit under an
organized crime statute.
This Note explains how Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,16 a recent
Supreme Court decision, should preclude legal employees from bringing
suit under civil RICO when employers knowingly hire unauthorized
workers. Part II of the Note describes the nature of unauthorized aliens and
how their presence especially challenges the legal, unskilled workforce.
Part II also explains past legislation and its relative ineffectiveness in
addressing the problem. Part III probes the most recent method for legal
workers to challenge the hiring of unauthorized aliens: civil RICO, a
statute traditionally used to fight organized crime. 17 As Part III explains,
the standing provision of civil RICO, specifically § 1964(c), has proved
most challenging to plaintiffs due to its "by reason of" proximate causation
requirement. Part IV surveys past civil RICO cases brought against
employers for hiring unauthorized aliens and analyzes how these courts
applied the proximate cause requirement of standing.
Part V presents the most recent Supreme Court case, Anza v. Ideal
Steel Supply Corp., that addresses the issue of proximate cause under the
civil RICO standing provision, § 1964(c). This Note then applies Anza's
proximate causation requirement to legal employees' civil RICO suits
13. See infra Part V (explaining recent cases legal employees brought under RICO).
14. See Part V.A-B (interpreting the effect of Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.).
15. See Part V.C (explaining Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc.).
16. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1997 (2006) (holding that the
defendant lacked standing to bring suit under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) because the defendants'
RICO predicate act did not directly harm the plaintiff).
17. See Michael Goldsmith & Evan S. Tilton, Proximate Cause in Civil Racketeering
Cases: The MisplacedRole of Victim Reliance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 83,88 (2002) (stating
that RICO was "conceived in a context principally concerned with organized crime").
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against employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens. It argues that
Anza imposes a higher proximate cause burden than previously applied for
standing under § 1964(c) because Anza defines direct causation as
requiring that the RICO violation automatically inflict the injury.
18
Furthermore, Part V shows that legal employee plaintiffs can no longer
establish standing because the hiring of unauthorized immigrants does not
automatically lead to depressed wages. It explains that the hiring of
unauthorized aliens does not necessarily lead to the depression of wages
and that such depression requires the additional legal act of the employer
choosing to decrease the wage rate. Because choosing to change the wage
rate is a necessary intermediate act for the hiring of unauthorized aliens to
cause wage depression, legal employees lack proximate causation for
standing under civil RICO.
This Note explains that thus far the lower courts have applied the
proximate causation requirement in an overly lenient manner and
contemplates that the Supreme Court may address the standing issue again
in order to clarify its position. Part VI explains that Anza is consistent with
the judicial trend of limiting civil RICO and, therefore, concludes that a
new legislative solution is desired to capture the political attractiveness of
third party enforcement with the needed government oversight that is
currently lacking. This Note proposes that such a solution is achievable
through legislation that includes a provision similar to the qui tam
provision in the False Claims Act, a sliding scale of fines, and a properly
funded electronic verification system.
H1. Background: The Problem of Unauthorized Aliens
Since the 1800s, the United States has struggled with the amount and
the type of immigration that is best for the country. 19 Regulation of legal
immigration has created a black market for those unable to remain legally
18. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997 (2006) ("[National Steel's] lowering of prices in no sense
required it to defraud the state tax authority. Likewise, the fact that a company commits tax
fraud does not mean the company will lower its prices .... ."); see also id. at 2004 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the majority's theory of proximate
causation permits a defendant to evade liability for intentional foreseeable harms "by concocting
a scheme under which a further, lawful and intentional step by the defendant is required to
inflict the injury").
19. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701-02 (1898) (describing the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which suspended immigration of Chinese laborers for ten
years).
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in the country.20 Despite various attempts, the problem of unauthorized
aliens has remained largely unresolved.2'
A. Characteristics of Unauthorized Aliens
Unauthorized aliens are foreign-born noncitizens who are not legal
residents.22 Unauthorized aliens can be divided into two categories of roughly
equal size: aliens who enter legally but overstay or violate the provisions of
their visa and aliens who enter the country illegally.23 In 2005, approximately
10.5 million unauthorized aliens resided in the United States. 24 An estimated
2.8 million unauthorized aliens live in California with recent and significant
increases occurring in Texas, California, Georgia, Arizona, Nevada, and North
Carolina.
As a general proposition, both unauthorized and legal aliens have less
education than native-born citizens.26 Although aliens comprised only 13% of
the working age population in 2000, they made up 28% of the population with
less than a high school diploma, and over half of them had less than 8 years of
20. See Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants Are Bolstering Social Security With Billions,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2005, at Al (describing how the Immigration Reform and Control Act
resulted in a black market for fake paperwork and as a result an estimated 75% of unauthorized
workers pay payroll taxes).
21. See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Cities Mesh Across Blurry Border, Despite Physical Barrier,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at A4 (explaining problems with the physical border constructed
between Tijuana, Mexico, and California).
22. See MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ESTIMATES OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2005 2
(2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ILL PE 2005.pdf ("The
unauthorized resident immigrant population is defined as all foreign-born non-citizens who are
not legal residents.").
23. See id. (defining unauthorized residents as "foreign-born persons who entered the
United States without inspection or who were admitted temporarily and stayed past the date they
were required to leave"); see also JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R. EDWARDS, THE CONGRESSIONAL
POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 12-13 (1999) (estimating that about half of unauthorized
aliens overstayed legal visas).
24. See HOEFER, supra note 22, at 1 ("DHS estimates that the unauthorized immigrant
population in the United States increased 24 percent from 8.5 million on January 1, 2000 to
10.5 million on January 1, 2005.").
25. See id. at 7 (describing increases in unauthorized aliens per state).
26. See George J. Borjas & Lawrence F. Katz, The Evolution of the Mexican-Born
Workforce in the United States 7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11281,
Apr. 2005) (stating that immigrants have disproportionately less education than native-born
citizens).
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schooling.27 Due to their comparably low education levels, unauthorized
migrants primarily compete in the low-skilled labor market.28  With
approximately 7.2 million unauthorized workers out of a 148 million worker
labor force, unauthorized aliens compromise 5% of the civilian labor force.29
Although employed in a variety of occupations, unauthorized aliens make up a
significant portion of the labor force in such fields as farming, janitorial
services, construction, and food preparation.3 °
B. The Most Affected Group: Low-Skilled Workers
31
Low-skilled Americans, including many members of minority groups,
compete most directly with unauthorized aliens for jobs. 32 Low-skilled jobs
typically have dangerous or undesirable characteristics that make the jobs less
appealing to the labor market.33 These undesirable characteristics cause a lower
27. See David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So Bad? 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11547, Aug. 2005) (explaining why immigrants primarily
compete in the low-skilled labor market); see also GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR 9 n.5
(2001) (stating that unauthorized aliens are disproportionately from Mexico); Borjas & Katz,
supra note 26, at 7 (stating that immigrants of Mexican descent average a lower level of
education than immigrants from any other source country).
28. See Borjas & Katz, supra note 26, at 7 (stating that in 2000 14.7% of the male
workforce and 39.8% of high school dropouts were foreign-born; among high school dropouts
with ten to fifteen years of experience, 47.5% of the workforce was foreign-born).
29. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 2 (2006), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/6 1.pdf (stating that
as of March 2005, unauthorized aliens composed approximately 4.9% of the labor market).
30. See id. at 11 fig. 10 (depicting that unauthorized immigrants compose 4.9% of all
workers and thus are overrepresented in such fields as cleaning (composing 24%), farming
(composing 17%), construction (composing 14%), food prep (composing 12%), and production
(composing 9%)); see also id. at 12 tbl. 1 (stating that unauthorized aliens compromise 36% of
all insulation workers, 29% of all roofers and drywall installers, and 27% of all butchers and
other food processing workers).
31. See George J. Borjas et al., Immigration and African-American Employment
Opportunities: The Response of Wages, Employment, and Incarceration to Labor Supply
Shocks 44 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12518, Nov. 2006) (finding
that among blacks with a high school education or less, the 1980-2000 immigrant influx
approximately accounts for 20-60% of the decline in black wage rates, 25% of the decline in
black employment, and 10% of the rise in black incarceration rates).
32. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976) ("[A]cceptance by illegal
aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress
wage scales and working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens.. . ."); see also
BORJAS, supra note 27, at 99 ("Because immigrants are disproportionately less skilled, it is the
less-skilled natives who pay the price of immigration.").
33. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 250 (18th ed. 2004)
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number of workers to choose to apply for and remain at such jobs; the demand
for labor creates a premium, which requires employers to pay higher wages.34
Without unauthorized aliens, the restricted supply of legal workers in this
market would command a relatively higher wage.35 Notably, however, fewer
total workers would be employed because the employer's labor demand
decreases as wages increase.36 Therefore, even if the government deported all
unauthorized aliens and each company remained in business, legal employees
would not fill these jobs on a one-to-one basis.37
C. Resulting Legislation
Before 1986, employers could legally hire unauthorized aliens; however,
unauthorized aliens were subject to arrest and deportation, and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) 38 conducted worksite raids as part of its
broader interior enforcement strategy.39 In 1986, Congress passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which imposed penalties upon
private employers in an effort to control illegal immigration.4° The sanctions
(explaining that despite the attractive feature of jobs requiring high amounts of human capital,
these jobs command high wages because of the relatively low supply of workers possessing the
given level of human capital).
34. See id. at 249-50 (describing how wage differentials serve to compensate for the
relative attractiveness among jobs).
35. See Borjas & Katz, supra note 26, at 39 (stating that the real wages of high school
dropouts would have increased by up to 8% without the Mexican immigration influx between
1980 and 2000).
36. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 336 (9th ed. 2006) (explaining that if unauthorized aliens enter the
labor market, the labor supply curve shifts outward and results in a lower equilibrium wage;
however, at the lower wage rate, employers are willing to hire more workers).
37. See id. (explaining that a higher wage rate results in decreased employment).
38. See Elizabeth Keyes, Developments in the Executive Branch: Transition from INS to
Department of Homeland Security: Authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security,
Delegations ofAuthority, and Immigration Laws, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 509, 509-10 (2003)
(describing how the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the functions of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
on March 1, 2003).
39. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1035 (1984) (describing a
workplace raid on a transmission repair shop in San Mateo, California).
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2000) ("Any person who, during any 12-month period,
knowingly hires for employment at least 10 individuals with actual knowledge that the
individuals are aliens described in subparagraph (B) shall be fined under title 18, United States
Code, or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both."); see also S. REP. No. 98-62, at 7-8
(1983) (stating that reducing the incentives to enter the United States is a more cost effective
and less intrusive means to decrease illegal immigration); Kathleen M. Johnson, Coping with
1250
RICO AT THE BORDER
included fines ranging from $250 to $10,000 per unauthorized alien, with
penalties escalating for repeat offenses.4' Jail terms were prescribed for
"pattern and practice" offenders.42 In practice, however, the INS rarely
imposed or collected civil penalties from employers, and criminal prosecutions
were extraordinarily rare-many employers were not even aware of their
obligations under this law.43
D. The Largely Unsolved Problem
Current enforcement is largely ineffective at decreasing the number of
unauthorized aliens entering the United States. 4 The current enforcement
policy involves heavy patrols in major cities along the Mexican border, light
patrols in unpopulated zones along the same border, and minimum presence
in the U.S. interior. 45 Worksite raids account for less than 1% of
apprehensions. 46 Since 1986, fewer than two dozen employers have paid fines
in excess of $75,000 for hiring illegal aliens, and in 2003 only 72 employers
were convicted for employing unauthorized aliens.47 In comparison, a
Illegal Immigrant Workers: Employer Sanctions, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 961 (1984)
(arguing that the pending employer verification system would be "both effective and fair" in
deterring illegal immigration).
41. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (describing punishment for hiring ten or more illegal aliens);
see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(1) (2005) (listing current fines for employing unauthorized
aliens).
42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (permitting jail terms for repeat offenders).
43. See Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 500-01 (2004) ("In practice the INS rarely imposes civil penalties or
collects them from employers, and criminal prosecutions are almost unheard of."); see also
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, at tbl.39 (2004),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2003/Table39.xs (depicting
that fines levied for immigration law violations fell from 778 in 1997 to 124 in 2003).
44. See PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MExIco DIVIDE 106-12
(2000) (describing the ineffectiveness of the high profile border enforcement in reducing
unauthorized aliens and stating that border enforcement has merely made enforcement visible to
benefit politicians).
45. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., America's Schizophrenic Immigration Policy: Race,
Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 768 (2000) (stating that most enforcement efforts are
concentrated on ports of entry).
46. See Trro BOERI ET AL., IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE WELFARE SYSTEM 17 (2002)
(stating that 5,800-0.6% of Border Patrol apprehensions--occurred at farms or other
worksites).
47. See id. (describing the enforcement of the government fine structure).
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watchdog website currently lists over 3,000 employers who hire unauthorized
aliens.48
Attempts to increase interior enforcement have been met with fierce
political opposition.49 Following raids of Georgia onion fields during the
1998 harvest, the U.S. Attorney General, both Georgia Senators, and
members of the Georgia Congressional Delegation criticized the INS for
injuring Georgia farmers; shortly thereafter, the raids ended.50 On December
12, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) raided six Swift &
Company facilities, which constituted the "largest-ever workplace crackdown
on illegal immigration. " 5' After the meatpacking raids in Marshalltown,
Iowa, both Senator Harkin and Governor Vilsack expressed their displeasure
to DHS Chairman Michael Chertoff.52 In addition to political opposition, a
lack of funding also prevents widespread enforcement efforts. 53 Because of
this void in government enforcement, concerned parties have turned to a
private means of enforcing immigration law-civil RICO.
48. See Federal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Coalition, We Hire Aliens,
http://www.wehirealiens.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (encouraging the boycott of 3,011
employers in forty-eight states for hiring unauthorized aliens) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
49. See Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Reining-in a Rogue Policy: The Imperative of
Immigration Reform, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 611,626-27 (1999) ("Immigration policy
has been captured by an unholy alliance that links religious organizations, ethnic groups,
libertarian economists, and the powerful American Immigration Lawyers Association, who all
have self interests and financial interests in maintaining the status quo, with corporate America
which has a vested interests in cheap labor policies.").
50. See Mark Krikorian, Lured by Jobs, Illegal Immigrants Risk Death at Border
Crossings, SANTA BARBARA NEWS-PREss, Apr. 25, 1999, available at http://www.cis.org/
articles/i 999/msk4-25-99.html ("During last year's Vidalia onion harvest in Georgia, for
instance, most workers fled after INS raids. Within days, both Georgia senators and three
representatives wrote to Attorney General Janet Reno fiercely criticizing the INS for 'lack of
regard for farmers."') (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. Jennifer Talhelm, Raids Draw Skepticism from Both Sides in Immigration Debate,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at A l (quoting Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff).
52. See Ken Black, Harkin Expresses Concern Over Handling of Swift Raid, TIMES
REPUBLICAN, Dec. 20, 2006, available at http://www.swiftraid.org/media/articles/12-20-
06Times-RepHarkinExpressesCon.pdf (describing the Senator's anger with the way DHS
handled the Swift raids); Ken Black, VilsackOutragedbyFedActions, TIMES REPUBLICAN, Dec.
20,2006, available at http://www.swiftraid.org/media/articles/12-20-06Times-RepVilsackOut
raged.pdf (describing the governor's anger about the Swift raids).
53. See Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration
Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 887, 931 (2006) (stating that the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement lacks the funds and personnel to effectively monitor citizens, legal aliens,
and unauthorized aliens).
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1X. The Use of Civil RICO to Privately Enforce Immigration Laws
Civil RICO allows private parties to recover treble damages for
predicate acts incorporated into criminal RICO. Private parties filing under
civil RICO, however, must meet the stringent standing provision of § 1964(c)
to sue in federal court.
A. Civil RICO Background
In 1996, Congress added violations of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA) to a long list of acts that qualify as predicate acts
under RICO. 4 Although Congress added the predicate acts hoping to aid
prosecutors in combating human smuggling,55 the same predicate acts have
created the newest private method to fight illegal immigration through its
application of civil RICO.56 The civil RICO provision of § 1964 allows
private parties to recover damages that occur as a result of violations of
criminal RICO. Section 1962, better known as criminal RICO, incorporates
four separate prohibitions:5 7 first, subsection (a) prohibits investing any
income derived from a "pattern of racketeering activity" in any enterprise that
affects interstate commerce; 58 second, subsection (b) prohibits acquiring or
maintaining any interest in or control of any enterprise affecting interstate
commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity;59 third, subsection (c)
prohibits conducting or participating in an enterprise's affairs through a
54. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 433, 110
Stat. 1214, 1274 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C § 1961(1)) (adding 8 U.S.C. § 1324 as a RICO
predicate act); Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 203(b)(4), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-566 (1996) (adding a felony hiring provision to
§ 1324).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 104-22, at 6 (1995) (suggesting that Congress acted to "combat
alien smuggling organizations"); see also, e.g., 139 CONG. REc. S9923 (daily ed. July30, 1993)
(remarks of Sen. Simpson) ("I support using [RICO] to prosecute organized smuggling gangs.").
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000) (granting standing to recover treble damages for a
violation of § 1962); id. § 1963(a) (stating the criminal punishment for a violation of § 1962).
57. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A DEFINrrMvE GUIDE 1 (1999) (describing the
relationship between §§ 1964 and 1962 and the requirements for § 1962's four causes of
action).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
59. Id. § 1962(b).
1253
64 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1243 (2007)
pattern of racketeering activity;60 and fourth, subsection (d) prohibits
conspiracy to violate any of the previous three provisions.6 '
Because of its breadth, most RICO claims are brought under the
participation racketeering provision of § 1962(c). 62 A "pattern of racketeering
activity" is at least two acts of racketeering activity within a ten year period, and
"racketeering activity" is any of a number of predicate acts defined in § 1961
from murder to passport fraud.63 In the immigration context, a pattern of
racketeering activity encompasses a violation of INA § 274 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1324), 64 which includes knowingly hiring ten or more unauthorized
aliens for employment during a twelve month period,65 concealing or harboring
unauthorized aliens, 66 or encouraging an unauthorized alien to enter the United
67arsncaStates. In theory, each suit arising under criminal RICO § 1962(c) can be
brought under civil RICO § 1964(c), which creates a private right of action for
"[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of
68RICO's substantive provisions.
B. Standing to Sue Under Civil RICO § 1964(c)
Standing poses a great challenge to civil RICO plaintiffs. Standing
determines whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of
its dispute and consists of both constitutional and prudential requirements.69
Every federal case must satisfy the constitutional Article III standing
requirements of injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability.70 Prudential
60. Id. § 1962(c).
61. Id. § 1962(d).
62. See Edward F. Mannino, Five Common Errors in Pleading Civil RICO Claims and
How to Avoid Them, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Jan. 2000, at 8, available at http://d2d.ali-
aba.org/_files/thumbs/components/l -MANNINO-90225_thumb.pdf(describing § 1962(c) as the
provision under which most civil RICO claims are brought).
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2000) (defining pattern of racketeering activity); id.
§ 1961 (1) (listing predicate acts).
64. See id. § 1961 (l)(F) (defining any violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 as a predicate act).
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A) (2000).
66. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).
67. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (granting standing to recover treble damages for a violation
of § 1962); id. § 1963(a) (providing the criminal punishment for a violation of § 1962).
69. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) ("In essence the question of
standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues.").
70. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (evaluating three components to
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standing, articulated in the underlying statute and judge-made doctrines,
determines additional limitations on each right of action.7 1 Section 1964(c)
creates a private civil cause of action providing that "[a]ny person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962 of this chapter may sue
therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover
threefold the damage he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee .... ,,7 2 Hence, four criteria are required for the case to satisfy
prudential standing: (1) the plaintiff must be a person who has (2) suffered
injury to (3) his or her business or property (4) by reason of the defendant's
violation of § 1962.
The Court has interpreted the "by reason of' requirement as the most
limiting element of standing under RICO.73 In Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corp.,74 the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a
plaintiff who had suffered damages as a result of harm done to a third party had
standing to recover damages under civil RICO. 75 Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC) brought suit in federal district court against seventy-five
defendants, including officers and directors of six different companies, 76 to
recover treble damages under § 1964(c) of civil RICO for securities fraud.77
SIPC, a congressional nonprofit organization, had instituted liquidation
proceedings against two failing securities brokerage houses, First State
Securities Corporation (FSSC) and Joseph Sebag, Inc. (Sebag) 78 and later
advanced $13 million to FSSC and Sebag's customers because the brokerages'
assets were inadequate to cover all of the claims.79 The defendant's stock
establish constitutional standing: (1) "injury in fact," (2) that is "fairly traceable" to defendant's
actions, and (3) "the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable [court] decision"); see also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining that constitutional
standing is "the irreducible constitutional minimum").
71. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (explaining that Congress may abrogate prudential
limitations on standing).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
73. See Victim of Alleged Shareholder Fraud Fails to Show Proximate Cause, CIVIL
RICO REPORT, Apr. 1, 1992, at I (stating that the direct causation requirement was the "high
court's first narrowing of available remedies under RICO").
74. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 271 (1992) (finding a lack of
direct causation for standing under § 1964(c) because plaintiff's injury was "purely contingent
on the harm suffered by the broker-dealers").
75. Id. at 259.
76. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1464 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd,
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (naming the defendants).
77. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 263.
78. Vigman, 908 F.2d at 1464.
79. Id.
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manipulation resulted in injury to the broker-dealers, which consequently left
the broker-dealers insolvent and unable to pay the plaintiff's claims. 80
The Holmes Court interpreted the phrase "by reason of' in § 1964(c) to
imply a proximate cause requirement for standing under civil RICO because
this language had been borrowed from antitrust legislation, which the Court had
previously interpreted to include a proximate cause requirement. 8' The
proximate cause requirement demands "some direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged. 82 The Court held that SIPC's
injuries were not direct because its customers' injuries resulted from the
defendants' harm to third parties, the broker-dealers, which consequently left
the broker-dealers insolvent and unable to pay SIPC's claims.
83
The Supreme Court reasoned that standing should be limited to direct
victims based on three justifications: (1) the difficulty in ascertaining the
damages attributable to the violation as opposed to independent factors; (2) the
difficulty in apportioning damages that would force the court to adopt
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different
levels of injury to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries; and (3) the presence
of more direct victims of the alleged violation who can be counted on to
vindicate the law.84 The Holmes Court deduced that it would be difficult to
ascertain the amount of harm the stock manipulation scheme caused the
plaintiffs because the broker-dealers' insolvency could be due to a variety of
factors other than the alleged manipulation scheme, such as poor business
practices or market developments. 85 This would likely involve the need for
complicated rules to allocate damages among the various levels of injury
caused.86 Furthermore, providing the indirectly injured party with standing
does not advance the statute's deterrence effect because the directly injured
victims can be relied upon to bring suit. 87 In fact, the broker-dealers had
80. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 262-63 (1992).
81. Id. at 265-66.
82. Id. at 266.
83. Id. at271-73.
84. See id at 269-70 (explaining the rationale behind the directness requirement); see
also Ryan C. Morris, Comment, Proximate Cause and Civil RICO Standing: The Narrowly
Restrictive and Mechanical Approach in Lerner v. Fleet Bank and Baisch v. Gallina, 2004 BYU
L. REv. 739, 777-78 (2004) (stating that the Holmes Court "makes clear that its 'directness'
admonition consists of analyzing proximate cause standing based on... those factors laid out in
the majority opinion and not general notions of directness").
85. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1992) (describing a
variety of situations that could have led to the brokerages' insolvency).
86. Id. at 265-66.
87. Id. at 269-70.
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already brought suit through an appointed trustee.88  The Supreme Court
emphasized the fear that permitting indirectly injured victims to bring suit
would open the door for "'massive and complex damages litigation, which
would not only burden the courts, but would also undermine the effectiveness
of treble-damages suits.'" 89 Although not a rigid test of directness, the Holmes
three-part justification guides the lower courts in determining the relation
between the conduct and the injury.90
IV. Applying Standing Doctrine Under Civil RICO Before Anza
Since the 1996 RICO amendment, several plaintiffs have brought suit
against companies for knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens. Civil RICO
appeared to be a method for those most hurt to privately enforce immigration
law and receive treble damages. Most importantly, before Anza v. Ideal Steel
Supply Corp., these types of cases seemed cognizable.
A. The First Use of Civil RICO for an Immigration Violation
In 2000, a group of competitors became the first plaintiffs to utilize the
new predicate immigration acts under civil RICO. 91 In Commercial Cleaning
92Services L.L.C. v. Colin Service Systems, a group of office cleaning
88. Id. at 273-74.
89. Id. at 274 (quoting Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 545 (1989)).
90. See id. at 274 ("[Olur use of the term 'direct' should merely be understood as a
reference to the proximate-cause enquiry that is informed by the concerns set out in the text.
We do not necessarily use it in the same sense as courts before us have .... "); see also Morris,
supra note 84, at 741 ("[Holmes] set forth three factors, none of which are rigid or per se rules,
to determine whether a plaintiff satisfies the proximate cause requirement of civil RICO
standing.").
91. See Commercial Cleaning Servs. L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21040, at *1 (D. Conn. 2000) (lodging a complaint under 18 U.S.C § 1964(c)), vacated,
271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001).
92. See Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 383-84 (holding that plaintiff met the
causation requirements as stated in Holmes). On a motion to dismiss, the Second Circuit
considered whether alleging that a defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by
hiring unauthorized aliens for profit was sufficient to meet the Holmes direct causation test. Id.
at 379. Defendant allegedly underbid competitor Plaintiff for cleaning contracts by means of an
illegal immigrant hiring scheme that allowed Defendant "a virtually limitless pool of workers on
short notice" at significantly lower prices than possible by operating lawfully. Id. The Second
Circuit found that Plaintiff met the three-part test to determine direct causation because if
Plaintiff's claims were substantiated: (1) Plaintiff could establish attributable damages through
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companies sued a competitor for lost profit from the defendant's underbidding,
which was possible because of the lower labor costs of employing unauthorized
aliens.93 The district court dismissed the case because it determined damages
would be too difficult to calculate in light of the multitude of factors reflected
in bid prices; 94 however, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff
was directly injured because the very purpose of the unauthorized hiring
scheme was to undercut its business rivals. 95 After reinstatement, the parties
reached a settlement favorable to the plaintiff.96 The Second Circuit's decision
and the subsequent favorable settlement encouraged analogous lawsuits in other
jurisdictions. 97
B. Legal Employees' Subsequent RICO Cases
After Commercial Cleaning, similar cases arose in the Sixth, Seventh,
98Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. In the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, legal
the amount of lost contracts due to Defendant's cost savings; (2) Plaintiff's alleged injury was
not a derivative injury; and (3) no other party's recovery would indirectly cure the loss suffered
by Plaintiff. Id. at 383-85.
93. See id. at 378 (alleging that the defendant janitorial service underbid plaintiffs by
relying on laborers that the defendant knew to be unauthorized).
94. See Commercial Cleaning, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21040 at *16-17 (finding
plaintiff's claim deficient on the first Holmes factor because of the difficulty in determining
whether Commercial's lost business to Colin was the result of an illegal immigrant hiring
scheme as opposed to independent business reasons).
95. See Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 384 (stating that the concern of the Holmes
Court was that a violator might be required to compensate both those directly injured and those
injured by the direct injury, but not that a violator might be obligated to compensate two or
more different classes of plaintiffs, each of which suffered a different concrete injury,
proximately caused by the violation).
96. See Commercial Cleaning v. Colin Serv. Sys. Inc., No. 3:99-cv-0019-09-CFD (D.
Conn. July 30, 2002) (granting a stipulated dismissal).
97. See Wendy Zellner, Hiring Illegals: The Risks Grow, Bus. WK. ONLINE, May 13,
2002, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02 19/b3782091.htm (last visited Mar.
2, 2007) ("The decision is a major step for Foster's legal theory because it acknowledges that
private parties can suffer damages from immigration law violations even when the government
is enforcing the law.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that
legal employees' wage-related RICO claims were not preempted by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) and that causation was adequately pled for the early stages of litigation);
Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 691-92 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that IBP did not meet the
enterprise requirement and further stating that the damages of diminished wages were too
remote to establish causation); Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that the legal employees met the Holmes causation test to surmount a motion to
dismiss); see also Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252, 1259 (1 1th Cir. 2005)
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employees filed class actions against large, agriculturally-based companies for
depressing their wages by employing unauthorized aliens.99 Each district court
initially dismissed the case against the agricultural companies due to the second
Holmes justification of speculative damages,'00 but both the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits reinstated the cases, holding that the suit did not consist of a passed-on
harm and that other alleged weaknesses in the chain of causation were matters
for summary judgment, not dismissal on the pleadings.'0 '
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated Mendoza v. Zirkel Fruit Co.
under the framework announced in Holmes.0 2 First, the court considered
whether there were more direct victims of the alleged wrongful conduct who
could bring suit. 10 3 It found that the legal employees were the most direct
victims because "[unauthorized] workers cannot 'be counted on to bring suit for
the law's vindication."' 1 4 Second, the court assessed the difficulty in
ascertaining damages attributable to the defendants' wrongful actions.'0 5
Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs had stated a plausible claim that
their wages were indeed lowered because of the defendants' scheme, and that
(holding that causation was adequately pled), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006), modified, 2006
U.S. App. LEXIS 24306 (11 th Cir. 2006).
99. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 840, 843-44 (E.D. Tenn. 2002)
(finding that plaintiffs lacked standing because plaintiffs only made a "conclusory allegation that
they ha[d] been damaged, and ha[d] not backed that allegation up with any assertion as to how
that damage ha[d] occurred"), rev'd, 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004); Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co.,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21126, at *24-30 (D. Wash. 2000) (finding plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring RICO claims because their damages were too speculative), rev'd, 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.
2002).
100. See Trollinger, 214 F. Supp. at 843 (evaluating plaintiffs' allegation under the second
Holmes justification and concluding that the finding that the hiring of illegal aliens depressed
the plaintiffs' wages requires sheer speculation); Mendoza, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21126, at
*28-29 (describing how plaintiffs' allegations were too speculative for standing because of the
wide range of factors that influence wages).
101. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 614-15 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating
that a RICO case with a traditional proximate cause problem such as a lack of foreseeability or a
speculative theory of damages is more appropriately dismissed on summaryjudgment than on a
motion to dismiss); Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002) ("It is
inappropriate at this stage to substitute speculation for the complaint's allegations of
causation .... The workers must be allowed to make their case through presentation of
evidence, including experts who will testify about the labor market, the geographic market, and
the effect of the illegal scheme.").
102. See Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1169 (focusing on the three justifications from Holmes).
103. See id. at 1170 (evaluating the case to determine if there was a more direct victim).
104. See id. (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 273 (1992)).
105. See id. at 1170-71 (evaluating the "speculative measure of harm" and distinguishing
between "uncertainty in the fact of damage and in the amount of damage").
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they should be given a chance to make their case through expert testimony.'
0 6
Third, the Ninth Circuit decided there was little risk of multiple recoveries
against the defendants because no other plaintiffs had been identified and the
defendants did not argue that such a risk existed.
0 7
Mendoza was the first RICO immigration suit to survive discovery and
summary judgment motions; on the brink of trial, however, the parties reached
a $1.3 million settlement. 10 8 This substantial recovery was widely reported and
suggested that a rising tide of additional lawsuits would be filed against similar
employers nationwide.'0 9
In Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., ° the Sixth Circuit found that the
plaintiffs alleged a direct injury because expert testimony could substantiate the
causal connection at a later stage of litigation."' Based on the direct
106. See id. at 1171 ("It is inappropriate at this stage to substitute speculation for the
complaint's allegations of causation .... The workers must be allowed to make their case
through presentation of evidence, including experts who will testify about the labor market, the
geographic market, and the effect of the illegal scheme.").
107. See id. at 1171-72 (evaluating the risk of multiple recovery and finding that no other
plaintiff had yet emerged and, furthermore, that this factor does not limit multiple groups of
plaintiffs when they each have concrete injury).
108. Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., No. 00-3024 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 20, 2006).
109. See Company Agrees to $1.3 Million Settlement of Claims that It Conspired to Hire
Undocumented Workers, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT UPDATE (Employment & Labor Practice of
Sidley Austin LLP) Jan. 30,2006, at 1, http://www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/Employent.
Labor_01 3006.pdf (suggesting that the settlement would cause more lawsuits to be filed) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
110. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602,605 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that
causation was adequately pled for the early stages of litigation). In Trollinger, the Sixth Circuit
considered whether alleging that a defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by
hiring unauthorized aliens for profit was sufficient to meet the Holmes direct causation test on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. at 605. The court also considered whether the
National Labor Recovery Act (NLRA) preempted legal employees' RICO claims. Id. The legal
employees alleged that the employer violated RICO by engaging in a scheme to depress the
wages paid to its hourly legal employee by knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1324. Trollinger, 370 F.3d at 605. A federal grand jury had previously indicted
Tyson for conspiring to smuggle and employ unauthorized aliens. Id. The Trollinger court
found the fact that the union negotiated plaintiffs' wages did not alter the more critical fact that
Tyson directly employed and paid the plaintiffs; and hence, finding a direct injury in this case
was consistent with the privity-of-contract roots of the direct-injury requirement. Id. at 616.
Furthermore, the NLRA did not preempt the legal employees' claims because the legal
employees did not need to prove a violation of the NLRA in order to establish violations of the
federal-law predicate act. Id. at 609.
111. See Trollinger, 370 F.3d at 619 (describing how plaintiffs could establish causation).
The court explained:
It remains possible that plaintiffs may prove the following allegations in their
complaint: (1) that Tyson hired sufficient numbers of illegal aliens to impact the
legal employees' wages; (2) that each additional illegal worker hired into the
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employment relationship between the defendant and plaintiffs, the Trollinger
court differentiated the case from the Holmes line of cases, where the plaintiffs
had no relationship with the defendants except through intermediaries." 2 It
also rejected the claim that the allegations were merely speculative on the
grounds that facts need only be alleged, not proven, to withstand dismissal on
the pleadings.'
1 3
A similar case in the Eleventh Circuit, Williams v. Mohawk Industries, "1
4
proved significant because of its eventual certiorari to the Supreme Court. In
Williams, the plaintiffs were Georgia carpet and rug factory workers alleging
depressed wages from Mohawk Industries's hiring of unauthorized aliens." 
5
When Mohawk Industries hired unauthorized aliens, Mohawk Industries
decreased the number of legal workers it hired and the labor pool increased,
which permitted it to depress the wages of legal workers." 6 The district court
denied Mohawk Industries's motion to dismiss the federal civil RICO claim."i
7
Using the reasoning of the Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the decision. 8 The Eleventh Circuit found that direct causation
existed because Mohawk Industries's illegal conduct was allegedly aimed
primarily at depressing the plaintiff's wages." 9 The court reasoned that the
bargaining unit by Tyson has a measurable impact on the bargained-for wage-scale;
(3) that the illegal immigrants allegedly brought into this country through Tyson's
efforts allowed Tyson not to compete with other businesses for unskilled labor; and
(4) that Tyson's legal workers did not "choose" to remain at Tyson for less money
than other businesses offered, but had no choice in the matter given the hiring
needs of the other businesses in the area and the influx of illegal immigrants at
Tyson's facilities. While Tyson's proximate-cause argument may well carry the
day at the summary-judgment stage, it requires more assistance than the complaint
alone provides.
Id.
112. See id. at 615-16 (differentiating the case from Holmes and stating that the fact that
the union merely negotiated the plaintiffs' wages did not alter the critical fact that Tyson
employed and paid plaintiffs directly).
113. See id. at 618-19 (finding that the plaintiffs' allegations were not speculative because
the plaintiffs alleged sufficient aliens in the workforce to lower the wage scale).
114. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252 (1 th Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct.
2016 (2006), modified, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 24306 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
115. Id. at 1255.
116. Id. at 1256.
117. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1354 (D. Ga. 2004), rev'd
411 F.3d 1252, vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006), modified, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 24306 (1 th
Cir. 2006).
118. See Williams, 411 F.3d at 1259 (using the reasoning ofMendoza and Tyson to explain
why plaintiffs have alleged direct causation as required under § 1964(c)).
119. See id. at 1263-64 (finding that the purpose of the defendant's scheme was to depress
the wages of legally documented employees).
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"fact that RICO specifically provides that illegal hiring is a predicate offense
indicates that Congress contemplated the enforcement of the immigration laws
through lawsuits like this one."'1
20
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Baker v. 1BP 2 1 is the lone exception in
interpreting civil RICO's direct causation requirement. Judge Easterbrook,
writing for the court, applied the direct causation requirement rigorously in a
case factually similar to other RICO immigration cases. In Baker, a group of
employees sued IBP for depressing wages by hiring unauthorized aliens.
123
Although Baker was disposed of on separate grounds, 124 the causation analysis
reveals that the legal employees' injury was too remote to establish damages.'
25
The Baker court found that the legal employees could not establish that the
hiring of unauthorized aliens directly caused their diminished wages because
the hiring of unauthorized aliens created an increase in the labor supply.' 26 As
supply increases and wages decrease, the court reasoned, workers will leave the
defendant's plant for higher wages elsewhere, which causes an equilibration
120. Id. at 1263.
121. See Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the hiring of
illegal aliens did not directly diminish the employees' wages, which made the employees' injury
too remote to establish damages under RICO). In Baker, the Seventh Circuit considered three
distinct issues: (1) whether legal employees represented by a union had subject matter
jurisdiction under the NLRA; (2) whether the employer was operating an "enterprise" as
required for treble damages under § 1964; and (3) whether the unlawful hiring of aliens was
sufficient to have directly caused legal employees' diminished wages. Id. at 686-92. According
to the Baker court, the NLRA did not apply to this case because the predicate offenses under
RICO are federal crimes apart from labor laws. Id. at 689. The Baker court stated that IBP was
legally required to pay the collective bargain wage rate; without the union as a party, the
plaintiffs could not settle the suit for higher hourly pay. Id. at 691. However, even if the union
was joined, the complaint failed to state a claim under RICO. Id. The legal employees did not
establish a pattern of racketeering activity because the employer was the enterprise; and without
a difference between the alleged operator of the enterprise and the "enterprise," there was no
violation of RICO. Id. at 691-92. Furthermore, even if the enterprise requirement was met, the
Baker court stated that the legal employees could not establish that the hiring of illegal aliens
directly diminished their wages, making their injury too remote to establish damages under
RICO. 1d. at 692.
122. See George C. Thomas III, Judges are not Economists and Other Reasons to be
Skeptical of Contingent Suppression Orders: A Response to Professor Dripps, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 47, 47 n. 1 (2001) (noting Judge Easterbrook as an economist).
123. Baker, 357 F.3d at 686-87.
124. See id. at 691 (holding that the defendant was entitled and legally required to pay the
collective bargain wage rate; therefore, without the union as a party, plaintiffs could not settle
this suit for higher hourly pay).
125. See id. at 692 (explaining that the legal employees could not establish direct causation
between the hiring of illegal aliens and their diminished wages, making their injury too remote
to establish damages under RICO).
126. Id.
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throughout the labor market. 127 Although this equilibrium wage could be
marginally lower, the widespread effect of an increase in labor would make the
individual impact insignificant, and the court found it unrealistic to apportion
such vast consequences to particular violations of the immigration statutes. 1
28
Furthermore, the court reasoned that even if the defendant was paying
unauthorized aliens less, and hence saving money, the plaintiffs had no right to
this cost savings because the plaintiffs had been paid all to which they were
entitled. 129 Although distinctive from the prior RICO immigration cases, Baker
is the first immigration RICO case that approaches the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Anza.
V. Legal Employees' Use of Civil RICO Should Cease Under Anza's New
Standard
The tables appeared to turn for employers after the Supreme Court's
decision in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.'30 on June 5, 2006, and the
Court's subsequent dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted in Mohawk
Industries v. Williams. 131 Following Mohawk's failure to obtain an order of
dismissal in the Eleventh Circuit, Mohawk filed a petition with the Supreme
Court regarding: (1) whether a defendant corporation and its agents can
constitute an enterprise and (2) whether the plaintiffs had shown that the
defendant proximately caused injury to the plaintiffs' businesses or properties
by alleging that the hourly wages the plaintiffs voluntarily accepted were too
low. 132 The Supreme Court initially granted certiorari limited to the enterprise
question, but after the parties gave oral arguments, the Supreme Court
dismissed its previous grant of certiorari as improvidently granted.' 33 It vacated
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. ("Suppose that plaintiffs believed that IBP has violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act by failing to calculate other workers' overtime premium; could plaintiffs obtain
damages from IBP even though it had paid them all that the FLSA requires?").
130. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1997 (2006) (holding that the
defendant lacked standing because the plaintiff was not a direct victim of the defendant's RICO
predicate act of mail fraud); see also infra Part V.A (discussing Anza in detail).
131. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 126 S. Ct. 2016, 2016 (2006) (dismissing
certiorari as improvidently granted, vacating the judgment, and remanding to the Eleventh
Circuit for further consideration in light of Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.).
132. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mohawk Indus., 126 S. Ct. 2016 (No. 05-465), 2005
WL 2566486.
133. Mohawklndus., 126 S. Ct. at 2016.
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the Eleventh Circuit's decision and remanded the case back to the Eleventh
Circuit for reconsideration in light of Anza. 1
34
Given the circumstances surrounding the Supreme Court's dismissal of
Mohawk Industries v. Williams as improvidently granted, the Supreme Court
seemed to suggest that the Eleventh Circuit's prior ruling contradicted Anza.
Typically, the Court will not dismiss a petition absent intervening factors that
were not known or appreciated at the time it was granted. 135 The Supreme
Court does, however, remand cases for further consideration when the Justices
have found enough similarity between the case before them and the intervening
decision to denote that the judgment below is in error, and yet the Court is not
prepared to reverse such a decision outright because of other aspects of the
case. 136 This type of remand is used to "improve the fairness and accuracy of
judicial outcomes while at the same time serving as a cautious and deferential
alternative to summary reversal."'137 Because the Supreme Court was well
aware of the facts of Williams after oral arguments, 38 the remand indicates that
the Eleventh Circuit's earlier decision needed to be carefully reexamined to




135. See Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG: An
Empirical and Institutional Analysis, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2005) (explaining the
significance of the Court's dismissing a case as improvidently granted due to the Court's limited
case docket and the inherent importance of any case in which certiorari is granted); see also id.
at 1434 (stating that from 1954 to 2005, the Court only dismissed as improvidently granted 155
cases, averaging about three per term).
136. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act
of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1720-21 (1978) ("The
Court said that remand orders do not amount to a final determination on the merits, but that they
do 'indicate that we [find the intervening precedent] sufficiently analogous and, perhaps,
decisive to compel re-examination of the case."' (quoting Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S.
776, 777 (1964))).
137. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 168 (1996); see also, e.g., Sharpe v. United States,
712 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983) (Russell, J., dissenting) ("The Supreme Court was seeking to be
gentle with us but there is ... no mistaking what they expected us to do. The Supreme Court
thought [the intervening decision] both relevant and dispositive .. "), rev'd, 470 U.S. 675
(1985).
138. See Shaun P. Martin, Gaming the GVR, 36 Apiz. ST. L.J. 551,557-58(2004) (noting
that most modem Supreme Court remands occur before oral arguments and briefing).
139. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 126 S. Ct. 2016, 2016 (2006) (holding
certiorari improvidently granted, vacating the judgment, and remanding to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light ofAnza v. Ideal Steel Supply
Corp); see Marie Coyle, High Court Reins In RICO: Anti-civil RICO Forces Get a Win-But
It's Not Over, NAT'L LAW J., June 12, 2006, at 1 ("[T]he high court delivered a blow to a RICO
class action... vacat[ing] the workers' favorable judgment by the 11 th U.S. Circuit Court of
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A. The Determinative Case: Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.
Although Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. is not a civil RICO case based
on immigration, the ruling rests on the issue of proximate causation under
§ 1964(c). Because Anza further restricts standing based on a redefined theory
of direct causation, Anza should play a determinative role in deciding
employees' RICO immigration cases.
In Anza, Ideal Steel brought a civil suit under § 1964(c) against its
competitor, National Steel Supply, Inc., alleging that National Steel engaged in
the RICO predicate act of mail fraud to conceal not charging sales tax on cash
sales. 40 According to Ideal Steel, National Steel implemented the scheme to
lower its prices and gain a competitive advantage.' 4' Ideal Steel's argument
failed in district court, where its case was dismissed, 42 but the Second Circuit
adopted Ideal Steel's theory of the case, holding that where a complaint alleges
a pattern of racketeering activity "that was intended to and did give the
defendant a competitive advantage over the plaintiff, the complaint adequately
pleads proximate cause, and the plaintiff has standing to pursue a civil RICO
claim." 143
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Ideal Steel's complaint lacked
the directness requirement of Holmes'44 because § 1964(c) requires proof of
"some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct
alleged."'' 45 Using the rationale behind the Holmes decision, the Anza court
noted the difficulty of determining damages because National Steel's decreased
prices and Ideal Steel's lost sales could be attributed to numerous causes.
14 6
Additionally, the state of New York, as the immediate victim, could vindicate
Appeals and direct[ing the] appellate court to reconsider [its decision] in light of its proximate
cause ruling in Anza.").
140. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1994-95 (2006).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 1995 (stating that the district court granted the petitioners' motion to dismiss
because the plaintiff had not shown reliance on the petitioners' misrepresentations, as required
in RICO mail and wire fraud claims).
143. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 F.3d 251,263 (2d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S.Ct.
1991 (2006).
144. See supra Part II.B (discussing standing requirements of Holmes, the case that first
limited standing).
145. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997-98 (using the three-prong rationale of Holmes to explain
why Ideal Steel's injury is not sufficiently direct).
146. See id. at 1997 (explaining that National Steel "could have lowered its prices for any
number of reasons unconnected to the asserted pattern of fraud" and Ideal Steel's "lost sales
could have resulted from factors other than petitioners' alleged acts of fraud").
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the tax laws through its own claims. 47 In reaching its decision, the Court
emphasized that the directness requirement prevents "intricate, uncertain
inquiries from overrunning RICO litigation."' 48 This requirement cannot be
met when the immediate victim of the alleged unlawful conduct is a party other
than the plaintiff, and where the cause of the plaintiff's injuries is a set of
actions entirely distinct from the RICO violation.
49
B. Anza's Higher Standard
After Anza, the new proximate cause standard should prevent legal
employees from bringing suit under civil RICO. Although Anza begins and
largely ends with Holmes, 50 its redefinement of a "direct relation between the
harm and the injury" under § 1964(c) deliberately restricts previous lower
courts' applications of Holmes.'51
During oral arguments of Anza, the Supreme Court highlighted its intent
to reevaluate past circuit court decisions applying § 1964(c). 152  When
questioning National Steel about whether there was a more direct victim of its
RICO violation, which would be a reason to deny direct causation under
Holmes, Justice Ginsburg asked Ideal Steel about the Second Circuit's reliance
on Commercial Cleaning.153 Of course, Ideal Steel also relied heavily on
147. See id. at 1998 ("If the allegations are true, the State can be expected to pursue
appropriate remedies.").
148. See id. (describing why the damages would be too complicated to calculate). The
court stated:
A court considering the claim would need to begin by calculating the portion of
National's price drop attributable to the alleged pattern of racketeering activity. It
next would have to calculate the portion of Ideal's lost sales attributable to the
relevant part of the price drop. The element of proximate causation recognized in
Holmes is meant to prevent these types of intricate, uncertain inquiries from
overrunning RICO litigation.
Id.
149. See id. at 1997 ("The cause of Ideal's asserted harms, however, is a set of actions
(offering lower prices) entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation (defrauding the
State).").
150. See id. at 1995 ("Our analysis begins-and, as will become evident, largely ends-
with Holmes.").
151. For an example of the Supreme Court applying a past precedent in a more restrictive
manner, see, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).
152. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S.
Ct. 1991 (2006) (No. 04-443) (statements of Mr. Frederick, petitioner for National Steel, and
Justice Ginsberg) (discussing the application of Commercial Cleaning).
153. See id. (question of Justice Ginsberg) (asking the petitioner to address the holding of
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Commercial Cleaning's reasoning in its appellate brief to establish causation. 154
Rather than distinguishing Commercial Cleaning from its case, National Steel
replied that the Second Circuit decision was incorrect because Commercial
Cleaning's injury was indirect and hence, it lacked standing under civil
RICO.
15 5
In Anza, the Supreme Court accepted Ideal Steel's reasoning that the
government was the most direct victim, an option that the Second Circuit's
Commercial Cleaning decision never considered when it found that "there
[was] no class of potential plaintiffs who ha[d] been more directly injured by
the alleged RICO conspiracy." 156 National Steel's reliance on, and Ideal Steel's
unqualified rejection of Commercial Cleaning supports the conclusion that the
Supreme Court was consciously considering the appropriate standard for
standing under § 1964(c). Ultimately, the Anza Court rejected the theory that
National Steel's failure to pay sales tax directly caused Ideal Steel's lost sales
and with it rejected the Second Circuit's finding of direct causation in
Commercial Cleaning.157 The Supreme Court's rejection of Commercial
Cleaning is significant because Commercial Cleaning was the first immigration
case brought under RICO, and each subsequent RICO immigration case relied
directly or indirectly upon the Second Circuit's reasoning in Commercial
Cleaning to determine whether the plaintiffs had a "direct relation between the
harm and the injury."' 
58
Anza requires a higher level of causation at an earlier stage than previously
employed in civil RICO cases. Under Anza, § 1964(c) stipulates:
(1) directness cannot occur if an additional lawful act is necessary in order for
Commercial Cleaning); see also Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1285 (1 1th
Cir. 2006) (citing Commercial Cleaning as having similar factual bases for RICO liability),
vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006), modified, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 24306 (11 th Cir. 2006).
154. See Answer at 23-24, Anza, 126 S. Ct. 1991 (No. 04 Civ. 433), 2006 WL 448207
(citing Commercial Cleaning to explain why the Second Circuit opinion in Anza was correct).
155. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 12-13 (statement of Mr.
Frederick, petitioner for National Steel) (asserting that knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens is
only indirectly linked to creating a competitive edge over rivals).
156. Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Sys., 271 F.3d 374, 385 (2d Cir. 2001).
157. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1997 (finding plaintiff lacked
causation).
158. See Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that
Commercial Cleaning was one of two cases that the Court was relying on to decide the case);
see also Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 619 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
Mendoza Court reached the same result on similar facts). But see Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d
685, 692 (7th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that the Mendoza court found direct causation on
similar facts but explaining why the Mendoza court's finding was incorrect).
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the RICO violation to inflict plaintiffs injury and (2) this directness must be
shown at the pleading stage, instead of at the summary judgment stage. 5 9
1. The Heightened Pleading Requirement
Section 1964(c) defines the standing requirements for civil plaintiffs under
RICO. In Holmes the "by reason of' language was interpreted to require "some
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.'
' 60
Standing requirements are normally addressed through 12(b)(1) motions, but as
in Holmes, courts have traditionally addressed questions of civil RICO standing
on 12(b)(6) motions. After Holmes but before Anza, many circuit courts
interpreted narrowly the "by reason of' standing requirement of § 1964(c) to
require only dismissal of claims that resulted from harm caused to a third
party. 162 The Anza Court, however, imposed a higher pleading standard 163 than
a "set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." 164
Under Anza, a mere explanation of a possible direct injury is not
sufficient, even at the motion to dismiss stage; the direct injury must be
substantiated. In fact, the Supreme Court dismissed Ideal Steel's case on its
pleadings, despite Ideal Steel's specifically pleading that "the purpose and
159. See Coyle, supra note 139, at 1 ("Although the U.S. Supreme Court last week ducked
the questions everyone expected it to answer in two unrelated challenges under RICO, the
justices did tighten the reins on the law generally viewed by the business community as a legal
plague.").
160. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
161. See Assoc. Gen. Contractors., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
529 (1983) (explaining that the "by reason of' language of the Clayton Act explains the
proximate causation requirement as a necessary element of antitrust standing, despite being
addressed in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); see also Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472,481 n.7 (3d
Cir, 2000) (explaining that a motion to dismiss under RICO § 1964(c) is a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), rather than a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matterjurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(1), even though the proximate cause requirements are considered aspects of the
plaintiffs' standing to sue under § 1964(c)).
162. See Trollinger, 370 F.3d at 614-15 (stating that a RICO case with a derivative-injury
problem is better suited to dismissal on the pleadings than a RICO case with a traditional
proximate-cause problem such as a lack of foreseeability or a speculative theory of damages);
Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1171 ("Questions regarding the relevant labor market and power ... are
exceedingly complex and best addressed by economic experts and other evidence at a later stage
in the proceedings.").
163. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991,2003 n.5 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting from the majority by stating that it is not
fair to require a plaintiff to prove proximate causation at the motion to dismiss stage).
164. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 616 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
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direct effect" of National Steel's RICO violation was to cause Ideal Steel to lose
business, and despite Ideal Steel's explanation that in its highly competitive
market, the failure to charge sales tax allowed National Steel to drop its prices
by 8.25%.165 The Anza Court's finding of a lack of direct causation, despite
Ideal Steel's specificity in pleading, confirms that plaintiffs must diligently
establish, not merely allege, direct causation in their complaint in order to avoid
a motion to dismiss.
Standing under § 1964(c) requires a direct relationship between the hiring
of unauthorized aliens and the legal employees' depressed wages. Because
direct causation is an element of standing under civil RICO, legal employees
bear the burden of establishing direct causation when filing a complaint.1
66
With legal employees bearing the burden of establishing direct causation at the
pleading stage, courts cannot speculate whether the legal employees could show
direct causation with the help of expert witnesses or discovery. Legal
employees' unsubstantiated causation analysis will not satisfy Anza's directness
requirement. In essence, the plaintiffs must prove standing in the complaint-a
nearly impossible task for legal employees.
2. The Stricter Direct Relation Test
The directness standard for standing under § 1964(c) is significantly more
restrictive under Anza than previously applied under Holmes.167 In Holmes, the
defendants' stock manipulation resulted in injury to the broker-dealers, which
consequently left the broker-dealers insolvent and unable to pay the plaintiff's
claims; therefore, the injury was not sufficiently direct for standing under
§ 1964(c). 168 After Holmes, courts interpreted the directness requirement to169
deny standing to plaintiffs harmed as a result of a third party injury. In Anza,
165. Joint Appendix at 22-23, Anza, 126 S. Ct. 1991 (No. 04 Civ. 433), 2006 WL 122082
(providing Ideal Steel's complaint in the Southern District of New York); see also Anza, 126 S.
Ct. at 2004 (dismissing for lack of causation).
166. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (stating that a plaintiff
invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing all elements of standing).
167. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1999 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(stating that the majority's "theory of proximate causation.., is supported neither by the Act
nor by our decision in Holmes").
168. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 271-73 (1992) (finding that
the plaintiffs' harm was indirect because the harm occurred due to a third party's injury); see
also supra subpart III.B (detailing the facts of Holmes).
169. See, e.g., Trollinger, 370 F.3d at 615-16 (6th Cir. 2004) (differentiating the case from
Holmes because the employees' injury was not the result of a third party's injury); Mendoza v.
Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The documented employees here do not
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an analogous level of directness would result if Ideal Steel was injured when
New York was unable to give Ideal Steel some payment or benefit because
New York did not have enough tax revenue. Therefore, Ideal Steel was
alleging a more direct injury than the Holmes scenario because the defendant's
underpayment of taxes allowed the defendant, not a third party, to lower its
prices to injure Ideal Steel.'70
In Anza, however, the Supreme Court expanded the application of
indirectness to include plaintiffs harmed by a defendant's legal acts, even
where a RICO predicate act facilitates the legal act.171 In Anza, the Court stated
that an indirect injury includes Ideal Steel's injury from National Steel's legal
act of lowering its prices, despite the fact that mail fraud to avoid taxes, a RICO
predicate act, facilitated the price drop.172 Hence, the Anza Court requires a
more direct injury than previously applied in Holmes.
a. The Additional Requirements of Anza
UnderAnza, the question of whether an injury is sufficiently related to the
RICO violation is based on two fundamental questions. A court should ask,
first, whether a lawful act is necessary for the RICO violation to inflict the
injury173 and, second, whether defendant could commit the predicate act
without hurting the plaintiff. '74 In Anza, a legal act breaks the causation chain
and denies plaintiff standing. First, National Steel defrauded New York
through mail fraud-the RICO predicate act-which provided National Steel
with tax savings and extra cash. 175 National Steel then used the savings to
lower its prices-the lawful act. 176 Ideal Steel could not compete with these
complain of a passed-on harm.").
170. SeeAnzav. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1997 (2006) (stating that Ideal
Steel alleged that National Steel used the proceeds from the tax fraud to offer lower prices
designed to attract more customers from Ideal Steel).
171. See id. at 2004 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the
majority's theory of proximate causation permits a defendant to evade liability for intentional
foreseeable harms "by concocting a scheme under which a further, lawful and intentional step by
the defendant is required to inflict the injury").
172. Id. at 1997 (majority opinion).
173. Id. (explaining that tax fraud on New York was necessary to cause Ideal Steel's harm).
174. See id. at 1997 ("[National Steel's] lowering of prices in no sense required it to
defraud the state tax authority. Likewise, the fact that a company commits tax fraud does not
mean the company will lower its prices...
175. Id. at 1994.
176. Id.
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lowered prices and, as a result, lost sales. 177 The Court determined that this
lawful act of lowering prices broke the direct chain of causation between the
RICO violation of mail fraud for tax evasion and lost sales.
1 78
b. Applying Anza in Employees' RICO Immigration Cases
Legal employee plaintiffs should no longer be able to overcome a motion to
dismiss based on Anza's direct relation test and its corresponding justifications
because the hiring of unauthorized immigrants only hurts employees if the employer
chooses to use the increase in the labor supply to lower wages. This prerequisite of
choice illustrates that the act of choosing to lower wages, not the act of hiring
unauthorized aliens, is the direct cause of employees' injury-notably, choosing to
change the wage rate is not a RICO predicate act.
The causation chain in employee RICO immigration cases is similar to Anza's.
An employer hires unauthorized aliens-the RICO predicate act-which provides
the employer with an enlarged labor supply.179 To impact the wage rate, the
employer must then use this increased labor supply from the RICO act to decrease
its wage rate-a lawful act.'80 Legal employees accept this wage rate and are thus
injured. In neither Anza nor the employees' case does the predicate act
automatically result in the plaintiff's injury-neither cash savings fiom tax fraud nor
extra labor from hiring unauthorized aliens automatically results in harm to the
plaintiff.'8' The hiring of unauthorized aliens does not necessarily lead to the
depression of wages because (1) unauthorized aliens may equally affect the supply
and demand of labor, which causes no effect in the wage rate, and (2) even when
there is a greater effect on labor supply than labor demand, employers must choose
to use the increase in labor supply to decrease the wage rate instead of pursuing
other options, such as increasing production.
82
177. See id. (stating that Ideal Steel alleged a competitive disadvantage from National
Steel's tax fraud).
178. See id. at 1997 (finding a lack of direct causation because defendant's set of actions of
offering lower prices was entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation of defrauding the
state).
179. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAuS, supra note 33, at 58 (describing how immigration
increases the labor supply).
180. See, e.g., Idaho Commerce & Labor, Frequently Asked Questions, http://cl.idaho.gov/
Portal/ICL/aliasjobservice/tabID5582/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20,2007) (stating that
an employer can change or reduce an employee's rate of pay at any time as long as it remains
above minimum wage) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
181. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
182. See SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 33, at 58-59 (describing how immigration
shifts the supply curve for labor).
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The supply and demand of labor determines the wage rate. 183 For the
additional influx of unauthorized alien labor to affect the wage rate, the influx must
shift the supply of labor and the influx must not be offset with a subsequent shift in
the demand of labor. 184 In order for the hiring of unauthorized aliens to increase the
supply of labor, there must be a net increase in the supply of labor.
185
For any given economic area, the supply of labor only increases when the
number of workers entering the labor market exceeds the number of workers
leaving the labor market. 186 Although a number of factors cause workers to leave a
given labor market, the American economy is highly mobile and employees tend to
migrate when a higher wage rate is available elsewhere. 187 All other things being
equal, wage rates will decrease as the labor supply increases; however, as wage rates
decrease within a given economic area or industry, both legal and unauthorized
employees migrate in search of available opportunities in other economic areas or
industries, and the supply of labor decreases. 88 The migration effect lessens the
impact of an increase of labor in a single economic area.
Even assuming that the labor supply does not constrict to its pre-increase
position, the increase in the supply of labor will affect the wage rate only if a
subsequent shift in the demand of labor does not offset the shift in the supply of
labor. 189 Additional people-whether immigrants or youths entering the labor
force-not only take jobs but also make new jobs because they spend their earnings
on the output of other workers, thereby supporting additional employment.' 90 A
183. See id. at 246 fig. 13-3 (depicting the wage rate as the intersection of labor supply and
demand).
184. See id. at 59 (depicting how a shift in demand and a shift in supply for labor can offset
one another to keep the wage rate the same).
185. See id. at 58-59 (stating that the total supply of labor remains unchanged when native
citizens emigrate as aliens immigrate).
186. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text (explaining how the supply curve
shifts).
187. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 33, at 59 (emphasizing the mobility of the
American population).
188. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 36, at 328 (remarking that human capital theory
predicts that legal employees migrate based opportunities available elsewhere); see also William
H. Frey, Immigration and Internal Migration "Flight": A California Case Study, 16
POPULATION& ENv'T 353, 353-75 (1995) (finding that unskilled native-born workers, who are
in competition for jobs with low-skilled immigrants, are likely to leave their former
communities to find jobs elsewhere); Deborah Bulkeley & Zack Van Eyck, Utah is Ranked
Good for Commute Times, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), Mar. 31, 2005, at Al
(noting that the average worker commutes 24.3 minutes to work).
189. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 33, at 58-59 (explaining that supply shifts
do not affect wages when accompanied by a proportional demand shift).
190. Myths and Migration, ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 2006, at Finance & Economics (explaining
that additional labor creates additional demand by increasing the returns to capital).
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lower wage rate from a shift in the labor supply increases the potential return of
capital investment, which makes it more profitable to build new factories, and in so
doing, employers create additional demand for workers.191 As shown in Figure 1,
when the supply in labor increases from S to Si, the wage rate decreases from A to
E.192 However, when an increase in the demand of labor accompanies the increase
in the supply of labor, with a shift from D to DI, the wage rate remains the same,
with a mere shift from A to B.' 93
Figure 1
Quality of Labor
191. See id. (describing how additional labor creates greater returns on capital and hence
creates greater demand for labor); see also SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 33, at 564-65
(explaining the positive returns to labor as capital increases).
192. See SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 33, at 59 fig.3-10(a) (graphing the shift in
labor supply).
193. See id. at 59 fig.3-10(b) (graphing a shift in labor supply with a corresponding shift in
demand).
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Therefore, when capital expenditures fully adjust to increases in labor,
there is no long term impact on wages because the demand of labor
increases with the supply labor. 194 On an aggregate labor scale, even anti-
immigration economists agree that when capital adjustments are taken into
account, immigration affects wages very little.1 95
In situations where there is a greater effect on labor supply than on
labor demand, employers must choose to decrease wages instead of
pursuing other options, such as increasing production that would increase
labor demand. Since the decision to lower wages is a legal act,96 and the
decision is a prerequisite for the hiring of unauthorized aliens to cause
depressed wages, employees are not direct victims under Anza.1
97
This presence of an intermediate legal act is reflected when the
defendant is able to commit the predicate act without hurting the plaintiff
and the defendant could cause the injury without committing a predicate
act. In Anza, National Steel's "lowering of prices in no sense required it to
defraud the state tax authority. Likewise, the fact that a company commits
tax fraud does not mean the company will lower its prices; the additional
cash could go anywhere from asset acquisition to research and development
to dividend payouts." 198 The tax fraud only hurts Ideal Steel when National
Steel uses the savings to engage in direct price competition. 99
These considerations are also present in RICO immigration cases.
Hiring unauthorized aliens does not mean that an employer can necessarily
decrease wages. In fact, the hiring of unauthorized aliens may have equal
194. See Myths and Migration, supra note 190, at Finance & Economics (explaining that
as capital adjusts to increased labor, the wage rate readjusts).
195. See Borjas & Katz, supra note 26, at 39-40 (stating that immigration does not affect
the average American when capital adjustments are taken into account, but maintains that wages
of high school drop outs are decreased by five percent); see also Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano &
Giovanni Peri, Rethinking the Effects oflmmigration on Wages 26-31 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 12,497, July 2006) (finding that when capital adjustments are
taken into account, immigration has a positive effect on native citizen's wages, and has only
accounted for a small percent in the increase in the college to high school dropout wage gap).
196. See, e.g., Idaho Commerce & Labor, supra note 180 (stating that an employer can
change or reduce an employee's rate of pay at any time as long as it remains above minimum
wage).
197. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1997 (2006) ("The cause of
Ideal's asserted harms, however, is a set of actions (offering lower prices) entirely distinct from
the alleged RICO violation (defrauding the State).").
198. Id.
199. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 29 (statement of Justice Souter)
(explaining to respondent that Ideal's injury is indirectly caused as a result of the fraud
committed against New York).
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effects on the supply and demand of labor, which would cause no effect on
the wage rate. 200 Even when there is a greater effect on labor supply than
on labor demand, the additional legal act of choice breaks the direct
causation chain because employers must choose to use the increase in labor
supply to decrease the wage rate instead of pursuing other options, such as
increasing production. 201 Although it may seem harsh to deny standing to
low-skilled employees, Anza justifies such a finding.
3. Justifications for Denying Standing
In Holmes and Anza, the Supreme Court defended its findings of lack
202of standing based on three justifications. Based on the same reasoning,
legal employees should not have standing under § 1964(c) because of
(1) the difficulty in asserting damage, (2) the presence of a more direct
victim to vindicate the law, and (3) the difficulty in asserting complicated
rules to apportion damages for plaintiffs removed at different levels of
injury.
20 3
Courts would have difficulty in calculating damages in these types of
cases because of the variety of factors that impact labor supply and
demand. Although the supply and demand of labor determines wages,2 °4
factors such as labor force participation, worker productivity, education
level, technology, job preferences, and migration impact the supply and
demand of labor. 20 5 Even though migration is one factor that impacts the
supply and demand of labor, the impact of legal and unauthorized
migration would have to be further differentiated for the purposes of
determining damages.20 6 Additionally, independent factors, such as capital
200. See supra notes 189-93 (describing the effect of equal shifts in labor demand and
labor supply).
201. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 33, at 58-59 (describing how immigration
shifts the supply curve for labor).
202. See supra Part III.B (describing the three justifications for denying standing to
indirect victims).
203. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1998 (2006) (discussing the
justifications for not allowing standing to indirect victims); see also Holmes v. Sec. Investor
Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258,269-70 (1992) (discussing the rationale for not allowing standing to
indirect victims).
204. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 33, at 245 (graphing wage rates as
represented by labor supply and demand).
205. Id. at 244-61.
206. See id. at 248 ("[Tihe overall effect of recent has been an increase in the supply of
low-skilled workers."); see also supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (describing the
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investments to decrease the need for labor or good management to maintain
workers, also allow some employers to better influence wage rates. As the
Supreme Court explained in Anza, the vast number of factors that
207contribute to a given injury justifies denying standing in such cases.
Despite the ability of economic experts to isolate individual factors,
determining the extent of unauthorized aliens' offsetting impact on the
demand and supply curves is a matter of considerable economic debate.20 8
Furthermore, once determined, the degree of impact is likely unrealistic.
Even if legal employees would have received a higher wage but for the
hiring of unauthorized aliens, a higher relative wage rate raises costs,
which can result in business closure, factory relocation, or a production
shift to another facility.20 9 When any of the latter occurs, there is decrease
in the demand for labor. As shown in Figure 2, decreased demand for labor
causes the demand curve to shift to the left from D to D2 and wages
decrease from C to A. Therefore, an increase in wages may lead to massive
job losses when an employer goes out of business or decreased labor
demand, which is a much more significant injury than a marginally lower
210wage.
effect of migration).
207. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1997 (2006) (stating that
National Steel could have lowered its prices for any number of reasons unconnected to the
alleged fraud, such as simply concluding that the additional sales would justify a smaller profit
margin); see also First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 770-72 (2d Cir.
1994) (finding a lack of causation because the plaintiff could not prove that but for the
defendant's false property appraisals, plaintiff would not have lost money when loans secured
by the property went into default).
208. Compare generally Card, supra note 27, (finding that immigrants have a slight
positive impact), with BORJAS, supra note 27 (detailing the negative effects of immigration).
209. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 33, at 309-10 ("Having shown that the
nation gains from importing the goods produced by cheap foreign labor in which it has a
comparative advantage, we should not ignore the costs this strategy may temporarily impose on
affected workers and firms."); see also First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666,681-83
(1981) (stating that employers have the ability to expand the effective size of the labor pool by
closing plants or moving operations to places where labor is cheaper).
210. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 651-52 (detailing the negative impacts of
unemployment).
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The conflicting effects of the economic factors affecting local wages would
subject the judicial system to the same type of speculative proof that the Supreme
Court rejected in Anza.2 11
Although the presence of an immediate victim justifies the denial of standing
to the indirect victim, not all RICO predicate acts have a direct victim.
212
Congress formulated many of RICO's predicate acts with only criminal RICO in
mind, including the predicate acts based on immigration violations.21 3 For this
211. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1998 ("A court considering the claim would need to begin by
calculating the portion of National Steel's price drop attributable to the alleged pattern of
racketeering activity. It next would have to calculate the portion of Ideal's lost sales attributable
to the relevant part of the price drop.").
212. See id. at 1998 ("The requirement of direct causal connection is especially warranted
where the immediate victims of the alleged RICO violation can be expected to vindicate the
laws by pursuing their own claim.").
213. See H.R. REP. No. 104-22, at 6 (1995) (suggesting that Congress acted to "combat
alien smuggling organizations"); see also, e.g., 139 CONG. REc. S9923 (daily ed. July 30, 1993)
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reason, several predicate acts are unlikely to enable a private party to sue under
§ 1964(c) such as transporting obscene material or making a false statement on
a passport application.1 4 The inclusion of some predicate acts that do not
allow civil standing is not superfluous because the U.S. government has the
ability to use all predicate acts to prosecute parties civilly and criminally.
215
Courts consider immigration violations to be victimless crimes, which supports
the notion that the immigration RICO predicate act lacks a direct victim.
2 16
Immigration violations are crimes against the United States, 21 7 similar to Anza
where the state of New York was the direct victim of state tax violations.1 8
The difficulty in creating complicated rules to apportion damages for
plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury and its risk of duplicative
recovery is particularly troubling in these cases because of the ripple effect of
additional labor.219 When an additional worker enters a worksite, the increased
supply of labor shifts the supply curve.220 Assuming the demand for workers
remains constant, the wage rate will decrease until it meets the demand. 22' For
example, when a factory needs 100 qualified workers and 120 qualified
workers want thejob at $10 per hour, wages will decrease to $9.50 per hour so
only 100 workers want the job. The labor supply model grows with a larger
and more complex economy. Like a stone thrown into the middle of a lake,
each additional worker produces a ripple effect: In the immediate area, the
labor supply is affected foremost, but as workers migrate in search of available
(remarks of Sen. Simpson) ("I support using [RICO] to prosecute organized smuggling gangs.").
214. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000) (listing predicate acts to include § 1542 (false
statement in an application for a passport) and § 1465 (transportation of obscene material)).
215. See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202,209 (1997) ("Statutes must be
interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect.").
216. See United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing
immigration violations as victimless crimes); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 705 (1893) (asserting a sovereign nation's power to control immigration).
217. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 cmt. 2 (describing society as the
victim of immigration offenses); see also United States v. Gastelum-Almedia, 298 F.3d 1167,
1175 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing the government as the direct victim of immigration violations
for sentencing purposes).
218. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1997 (2006) (describing the
state of New York as the direct victim of tax fraud).
219. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 32-40 (statements of Justices
Scalia, Stevens, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts) (expressing their concern about a rule of
causation that would allow an unlimited number of plaintiffs to have standing under civil
RICO).
220. See SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 33, at 58-59 (depicting how an increase in
the supply of labor shifts the supply curve to the right and decreases the equilibrium wage rate).
221. See id. (demonstrating that the wage rate is determined by the intersection of the
supply and demand curves).
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opportunities, labor supply will also increase in the surrounding area and in
similar industries.222 Due to this ripple effect, any increase in the supply of
labor affects a potentially unlimited pool of uniquely injured plaintiffs. As
every low-skilled worker is at least marginally affected in an economy where
unauthorized aliens are hired, Anza sensibly eliminates the possibility of an
unlimited number of plaintiffs with standing to sue under civil RICO.
Using the reasoning and black letter law announced in Anza, legal
employees are not able to establish standing under § 1964(c) of civil RICO.
Although the hiring of unauthorized aliens arguably affects unskilled legal
employees most significantly, their injury is the indirect result of the labor
market. Such indirect injuries need to rely on the relief from those directly
injured, in this case-the U.S. government. Because immigration law
enforcement is the responsibility of the U.S. government, political means are
best able to give relief. However, the Anza precedent needs consistent
implementation in the lower courts before political pressure forces legislative
change.
C. Are the Lower Courts Following Anza?
223
Although a relatively new case, several courts have had the opportunity to
apply the new standard of Anza. Lower courts have not yet embraced this
narrowing of standing; however, their misinterpretations can guide other courts
in implementing the Supreme Court precedent.
1. Williams II
Following the Supreme Court's remand, the Eleventh Circuit issued its
second opinion in Williams (Williams I1), finding that the plaintiffs alleged a
sufficiently direct injury for standing under § 1964(c) because of a "direct
correlation between illegal hiring and lower wages., 224 However, the Eleventh
222. Supra note 188 and accompanying text.
223. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 8 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (describing
courts' use of precedent). Justice Scalia stated:
At its broadest, the holding of a case can be said to be the analytical principle that
produced the judgment.... In the narrowest sense, however (and courts will squint
narrowly when they wish to avoid an earlier decision), the holding of a case cannot
go beyond the facts that were before the court.
1d.
224. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1289 (1 lth Cir. 2006) (stating
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Circuit's reasoning erroneously applied Anza in evaluating the directness
requirement as a mere direct correlation requirement instead of analyzing
whether any lawful act interrupted the causal chain. 225
a. Heightened Pleading Requirement Ignored
In interpreting the "by reason of' language of § 1964(c), the Anza Court
emphasized that a "direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged" was required for standing.226 Although Anza clarifies that
courts should scrutinize proximate causation at the pleading stage,227 the
Williams H court restated that the pleadings were sufficient to deny a motion to
dismiss because the employer had allegedly "engaged in widespread and
knowing hiring and harboring of illegal aliens with the express purpose and
direct result of lowering the wages of legal workers." 228 A finding that merely
alleging a direct result is sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss is
inconsistent with Anza, as shown by the dismissal of Ideal Steel's case despite a
similar pleading.
229
The Williams II court relied on two pre-Anza decisions in reaching its
decision to allow discovery. Quoting the Trollinger and Mendoza decisions,
the court emphasized the potential benefits of economic experts.230 The
Williams II court admitted that the case "may not ultimately prove the
proximate-cause requirement," but decided that the direct relation was
that employing unauthorized aliens lowers legal employees' wages).
225. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1997 (2006) ("The cause of
Ideal's asserted harms, however, is a set of actions (offering lower prices) entirely distinct from
the alleged RICO violation (defrauding the State).").
226. See id. at 1997-98 (explaining the requirement of proximate cause for standing under
RICO); see also id. at 2003 n.5 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(dissenting from the majority by stating that it is not fair to require a plaintiff to prove proximate
causation at the motion to dismiss stage).
227. See Williams, 465 F.3d at 1287 ("Anza makes clear that courts should scrutinize
proximate causation at the pleading stage and carefully evaluate whether the injury pled was
proximately caused by the claimed RICO violations.").
228. See id. at 1292 ("Given this stage of the litigation, we conclude that the plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged that Mohawk's illegal conduct was aimed primarily at them.").
229. See Joint Appendix, supra note 165, at 11-13 (providing Ideal Steel's complaint in
the Southern District of New York). The complaint plead that "the purpose and direct effect" of
National Steel's RICO violation was to cause Ideal Steel to lose business and explained that
Ideal Steel and National Steel were in a highly competitive market where the failure to charge
sales tax allowed a 8.25% drop in National Steel's prices. Id.
230. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc. 465 F.3d 1277, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006)
(describing how the Trollinger and Mendoza courts found direct injury based on similar facts).
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sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 231 Under Anza, the court must find
a direct relationship on a motion to dismiss, not hypothesize that a direct
relationship could be found after discovery.
b. Misinterpretation ofAnza 's Directness Requirement
In Williams II, the Eleventh Circuit found direct causation on the basis that
depressing wages was Mohawk's direct purpose and intent.232 The Eleventh
Circuit's equating of purpose to causation contradicts Anza. The Anza Court
highlighted this mistake by stating that the Second Circuit contradicted Holmes
in finding that the defendant's route was immaterial if the defendant's purpose
was to harm the plaintiff.
233
The Eleventh Circuit mistook Anza's directness requirement with a mere
finding of "direct correlation., 234 Although the Eleventh Circuit specially noted
the Supreme Court's finding of a direct correlation between unauthorized aliens
and lower wages, 235 a direct correlation is not synonymous with Anza's finding
of direct causation. In Anza, the Supreme Court found no direct causation
between not paying taxes and increased sales, despite the correlation of
increased sales on tax-free weekends.236 For example, assuming all else
remains equal, if two stores are charging a dollar for a widget and store A does
not charge the 6% sales tax, store A's price will be 6% lower than store B's
price.237 However, under Anza, the fact that there is an economic correlation is
231. Id. at 1291.
232. See id. at 1289 ("[I]t is clear that the plaintiffs have alleged a sufficiently direct
relation... [because] Mohawk's widespread scheme of knowingly hiring and harboring illegal
workers has the purpose and direct result of depressing the wages paid to the plaintiffs.").
233. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1998 (2006) ("The Court of
Appeals reached a contrary conclusion, apparently reasoning that because the Anzas allegedly
sought to gain a competitive advantage over Ideal, it is immaterial whether they took an indirect
route to accomplish their goal. This rationale does not accord with Holmes.").
234. See Williams, 465 F.3d at 1289 (describing the direct correlation between the
employment of unauthorized aliens and lower wages for legal employees).
235. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court has already recognized a direct correlation
between illegal hiring and lower wages).
236. See Paul Duggan, Tax-Holiday Weekend in Texas A Hit With Families, Retailers;
Malls Are Jammed With Back-to-School Clothing Shoppers, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1999, at A3
(stating that average sales were 65% higher than normal on the weekend that allowed retailers
not to pay sales tax).
237. See SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 33, at 148 (stating that in a perfectly
competitive market, prices will be equal between stores); Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373
F.3d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that Ideal Steel and National Steel have substantially the
same products and compete on the basis of price).
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not enough because store A could fail to charge the sales tax and use the
savings for research and development, or store A could lower its prices by 6%
even if it were paying its taxes.238 The direct correlation test is insufficient to
determine a direct relationship because a direct correlation can occur even with
multiple independent steps required for the occurrence. For example, there is a
direct correlation between the occurrence of heart attacks and obesity.239
However, it is not obesity that causes heart attacks but the excess consumption
of trans and saturated fats, which have to clog the heart's arteries before a heart
attack occurs.240 The direct correlation test reflects the concept of foreseeability
(i.e., a heart attack is foreseeable based on obesity), which was previously
rejected as too lenient.24'
The Williams II Court attempted to validate its position through the three
justifications asserted in Anza and Holmes. The court used its lack of finding a
more direct victim to justify finding that the legal employees were the direct
victim. 242 Even if the court wanted to reject the United States as the most direct
victim, 243 although this seems closely analogous to the state of New York as the
most direct victim of state tax fraud,24 the court's reasoning assumed that every
RICO predicate act has a direct victim who can bring suit under RICO. Anza
did not find that the state of New York was the most direct victim because
every RICO predicate requires a direct victim; the Supreme Court merely
named the state of New York as the direct victim to better explain why Ideal
Steel was an indirect victim. 245 The directness requirement for standing under
238. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997 (noting that businesses lose customers and lower prices
for many reasons).
239. See Ron Winslow, WHO Seeks Global Action On Spread ofHeart Disease, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 18, 2002, at B6 (discussing the connection between heart attacks and obesity).
240. See Bill Marsh, A Primer on Fat, Some of It Good for You, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2002, at F7 (stating that trans and saturated fats clog arteries, which is linked to heart disease).
241. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 248, 268-69 (1991) (explaining
that harm flowing from the misfortunes of a third person is too remote to allow recovery); see
also Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 908 (1 lth Cir. 1998)
("[T]he test for RICO standing is whether the alleged injury was directly caused by the RICO
violation, not whether such harm was reasonably foreseeable.").
242. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1292 (11 th Cir. 2006) (finding
that the legal employees were the most direct victim of the immigration violations (citing
Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2002))).
243. See id at 1290 (rejecting the United States as the most direct victim because the
United States' responsibility of enforcing all criminal law).
244. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1998 (2006) (describing New
York as the direct victim of state tax fraud).
245. See id. (describing the direct causal connection as especially warranted when another
party is expected to vindicate the law).
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civil RICO standing is not satisfied on the sole basis that the court finds the
plaintiff to be the best possible plaintiff.
The Williams II court also rejected the argument that damages were
speculative or difficult to ascertain because, as opposed to Ideal Steel's lost
sales, wages are received directly from the employer. 46 However, this
reasoning is unconvincing because decreased wages are attributable to
numerous reasons, just as Ideal Steel's lost sales were attributable to numerous
reasons. 247 Unfortunately, thus far, the reasoning of Williams H has influenced
other circuits' interpretation of Anza in RICO immigration cases.
2. Implications of Williams II
As a result of the Supreme Court remand in Williams, the Eleventh Circuit
was the first lower court to interpret Anza in a case where legal employees
alleged that an employer depressed wages by hiring unauthorized aliens.
Relying on Williams II, the Sixth Circuit denied an interlocutory appeal in
Trollinger248 despite the new direct causation standard announced in Anza.
249
Notwithstanding these initial contrary rulings, Anza eradicates the means for
legal employees to have standing under civil RICO to obtain damages for
employers' hiring of unauthorized aliens.
There is little doubt that the employer defendants in Williams II will again
petition the Supreme Court to seek review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision.
But even if they do not, the Supreme Court could address this issue again
shortly. 250  When it does, the Supreme Court should confirm that legal
employees are unable to use civil RICO as a means to curb the employment of
unauthorized aliens. Without this avenue of attack, Congress should consider
implementing a new means to enforce its immigration law and adopt a new
strategy to help those most affected.
246. See Williams, 465 F.3d at 1290 (stating that the fear of speculative damages is not a
concern given the facts of the case).
247. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1998 (finding that damages were too speculative because
National's decreased prices and Ideal's lost sales are attributable to numerous reasons); see also
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 33, at 243-60 (describing the numerous factors that
impact wages).
248. See supra notes 110-11 (explaining the facts of Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.).
249. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71500, *13 (D. Tenn.
2006) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit panel had the benefit of Anza when it analyzed and
rejected the same arguments that Tyson has made).
250. See Solimine & Gely, supra note 135, at 1464 (stating that the average number of
years that it takes the Court to revisit an issue from a case dismissed as improvidently granted
has declined from 9.19 years between 1954 and 1969 to about two years since 1992).
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VI. The Need for Change
In light of Anza and the Supreme Court's distaste for RICO plaintiffs,
Congress needs to take the challenge of creating a statute that highlights the
strengths of civil RICO and minimizes its greatest drawbacks. Legislation that
provides for the private monitoring of employers with the advantage of
prosecutorial discretion would benefit all parties in the immigration debate.
A. Anza is Consistent with the Judicial Trend
Since civil RICO's enactment, the judiciary has lamented its broad grant
of standing in federal court.25 1  Despite years of judicial complaint and
suggested reform, Congress has only limited the use of civil RICO for securities
fraud. 2  Anza is consistent with the judiciary's trend toward decreased
tolerance for civil RICO as evidenced by the fact that most civil RICO claims
have been dismissed pre-trial for failure to state a claim, which stands in stark
contrast to the relatively rare dismissals of general civil litigation. 3 If'properly
evaluated, the direct causation standard announced in Anza should effectively
preclude the use of civil RICO as a backdoor approach to enforcing U.S.
immigration law. Regardless of whether this violates the congressional intent
251. See, e.g., William J. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice, 21 ST. MARY's L.J. 5,
13 (1989) ("I think that the time has arrived for Congress to enact amendments to civil RICO to
limit its scope to the sort of wrongs that are connected to organized crime, or have some other
reason for being in federal court."); David B. Sentelle, Civil RICO: The Judges'Perspective,
and Some Notes on Practice for North Carolina Lawyers, 12 CAMPBELL L. REv. 145, 148
(1990) (emphasizing judges' dislike of RICO cases); see also L. Gordon Crovitz, RICO: The
Legalized Extortion and Shakedown Racket, in THE RICO RACKET 15, 15 (Samuel A. Alito, Jr.
et al. eds., 1989) ("It is one of the great virtues of the American system ofjustice that most legal
abuses are committed in violation of the law, not in the name of the law. The Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law is a leading exception to the rule.").
252. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat.
758 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and removing securities fraud as a predicate act under
RICO); see also Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons from
Civil RICO, 50 SMU L. REv. 33, 34 (1996) (stating that the Senate overrode President Clinton's
presidential veto to restrict RICO for the first time to eliminate securities fraud as a predicate
act).
253. Compare Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2002)
(presenting results from a survey of all federal appellate decisions in RICO civil cases rendered
between 1999 and 2001, indicating affirmation of trial court dismissal or summary judgment for
defendants in almost 70% of cases), with CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 321-25 (1990) ("The motion to dismiss is viewed with disfavor and
is rarely granted."). But see Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is
Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493,498-501 (1996) (arguing that strength of a statute cannot be
determined based on the win rate).
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for RICO, 25 4 Anza should encourage Congress to find a better method to
implement immigration law.
The United States has continuously struggled with enforcing its
immigration policy. 255  Because of the economic impetus of unauthorized
migration, employers are in a unique position to monitor its status.
256
Regardless of the efficiency of enlisting employers to enforce immigration law
as "gatekeepers," an employer's own best interest is served by an increase in the
labor supply to permit lower wages.257 On the other hand, low-skilled legal
employees are the most negatively impacted by unauthorized aliens and hence
have the most incentive to ensure the enforcement of U.S. immigration law.
258
Although in theory, civil RICO would allow legal employees to enforce the
employer's gatekeeping function, legal employees are not directly harmed by
the hiring of unauthorized aliens, as previously discussed,259 and it is difficult
for legal employees, as well as employers for that matter, to establish with
certainty whether unauthorized aliens are even being hired.26°
B. An Opportunity for a New Solution
Since Anza should shut the door on private immigration enforcement, new
legislation that capitalizes on the strengths of civil RICO and minimizes its
weaknesses is needed for a better approach to immigration enforcement. The
main advantage of civil RICO is its creation of a "private attorney general" to
254. See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-22 (1995) (making no mention of the immigration
predicate acts' possible use under civil RICO and instead focusing on how these provisions will
help federal law enforcement officials use RICO to combat alien smuggling operations); see
also Crovitz, supra note 251, at 16 (stating that standing under civil RICO was broadly crafted
because Congress wanted to ensure that the Supreme Court would not invalidate the entire law
due to the unconstitutionality of prohibiting status crimes).
255. See supra Part II.D (detailing enforcement problems).
256. See BORJAS, supra note 27, at 204 (describing economic incentives as the primary
factor of unauthorized aliens remaining in the United States).
257. See Manns, supra note 53, at 932 (describing how both employers of low-wage
workers and unauthorized aliens share a strong mutual economic interest in evading in
substantive compliance with immigration law).
258. See supra Part II.B (describing how unauthorized aliens compete most directly with
low-skilled natives).
259. See supra Part V.B.2.b (detailing legal employees' indirect injury of wage
depression).
260. See Porter, supra note 20, at Al (describing the widespread use of fake papers).
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monitor compliance with federal law.26' In civil RICO, however, the
gatekeepers are over-penalized:
There is no such thing as prosecutorial discretion to limit the use of civil
RICO by plaintiffs' attorneys. Any good lawyer who can bring himself
within the terms of the federal civil RICO provisions will sue in federal
court because of the prospect of treble damages and attorneys' fees which
civil RICO holds out.
262
As a result, deal legislation would (1) provide a provision similar to the qui tam
provision in the False Claims Act,263 (2) create a sliding scale of fines, and
(3) properly fund an electronic verification system in order to allow an efficient
method to enforce and defend litigation.
As Jeffrey Manns suggests, a qui tam provision in the Immigration and
Naturalization Act may provide a suitable vehicle for interconnection of private
and public enforcement.264 The qui tam provision confers standing on third
parties to allow them to sue on behalf of the government where otherwise only
the government, as the injured party, would have standing to sue.265 In the
False Claim Act, the qui tam provision seeks to recover money that has been
defrauded from the government; 266 however, a similar provision would allow
employers of unskilled employees to be monitored as gatekeepers without the
ongoing threat of class action treble damages. Qui tam litigants disclose all
material evidence about the claims to the government, and, for a statutory
period of time, the government has the option to assume control of the case.267
If the government chooses to assume control of the case, the government
awards the party costs plus a percentage of the penalty imposed, but if the
government chooses not to assume control, the qui tam litigants have the option
261. See Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985) ("Private attorney general
provisions such as § 1964(c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps.").
262. William J. Rehnquist, Reforming RICO, in THE RICO RAcKEr, supra note 251, at 65.
263. See Aaron R. Petty, Note, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public Corruption, 39
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 851, 863 (2006) (explaining that qui tam provisions confer standing on
third parties to allow them to sue on behalf of the government, where otherwise only the
government, as the injured party, would have standing to sue).
264. See Manms, supra note 53, at 952-59 (discussing the use of a qui tam provision to
enforce immigration law).
265. See Petty, supra note 263, at 863 (explaining the justification for standing in qui tam
litigation).
266. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2000) (providing for awards under the
qui tam provision).
267. See Joel M. Androphy & Mark A. Correro, Whistleblower and Federal Qui Tam
Litigation-Suing the Corporationfor Fraud, 45 S. TEX. L. REv. 23, 29-34 (2003) (describing
the basics of a qui tam action under the False Claims Act).
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of continuing the action with the incentive of a higher percent of the penalties if
they prevail. 268 The government can practice prosecutorial discretion and guard
against unreasonable damages because it controls the incentive to litigate by
increasing or decreasing related fines. A qui tam provision maintains the
inherent efficiency of the employer as the gatekeeper, as well as provides the
benefit of prosecutorial discretion without the stigma of a mob statute or the
ongoing threat of treble damages of RICO.269
A new structure for fines is needed to provide litigants the incentive to file
suit as well as to provide a reasonable deterrent to employers. The current
government fine structure has not produced results due to a lack of enforcement
and the inconsequential nature of the fines to large companies. 270 A sliding
scale of fines based on size and profit would provide an incentive for legal
employees to file qui tam actions as well as provide a reasonable deterrent to
companies of all sizes.27 1
Employers need a viable verification system to determine work eligibility.
This system would allow legal employees to sue employers without
unreasonable cost and permit employers to successfully defend their
employment practices.272 Currently, unauthorized aliens need only give some
form of facially valid paperwork in order to receive employment because, as
long as the unauthorized aliens furnish a readily available false document, the
employer does not "know" that they are employing unauthorized aliens.273 A
means to resolve this problem is already in place--the Basic Pilot Program, a
268. See id. (describing the award procedure under the qui tam provision of the False
Claims Act); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (providing a qui tam provision).
269. See ABC News: Antimob Law Pursued in Immigration Case (ABC television
broadcast Apr. 26, 2006) (stating that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus brief on
behalf of the employer to argue that the statute threatens legitimate businesses that cannot risk
"the reputational injury of being sued in federal court under a statute associated with racketeers
and mobsters") (transcript on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
270. See supra Part II.D (describing the current fines and the lack of enforcement); see also
Manns, supra note 53, at 943 n.250 (noting that Wal-Mart's fine of $11 million will serve as
little deterrent because the fine "appears so miniscule to a $220 billion corporation").
271. See Manns, supra note 53, at 956-57 (arguing that the current penalties for employing
unauthorized workers are inconsequential and proposing a fine structure ranging from $15,000
for employers of one to fifteen workers to $75,000 for employers of more than 200 workers with
additional fines for repeat offenders).
272. See Briggs, supra note 49, at 626 (describing how immigration legislation failed to
include a viable verification system for employers to ascertain work eligibility, which is the
most important means needed to curb abuse).
273. See Porter, supra note 27, at Al (describing the use of fake IDs to obtain jobs); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2000) (requiring the mens rea of knowledge to convict an employer of
hiring unauthorized aliens); BORJAS, supra note 22, at 204 (stating that the employers must
merely review facially valid documents in order to be in compliance).
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274voluntary electronic verification program. The Basic Pilot Program is a
computer program that allows employers to check all prospective legal
employees' social security numbers against an electronic Social Security
Administration database and a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
database.275 If the data is not found in either database after a manual check and
the employee does not file an appeal, the employee is presumed to be an
unauthorized worker.276 With proper funding to alleviate the program's
technical glitches, all employers could guarantee that they were in conformity
of the law. By creating the presumption of a violation if employees were not
verified in the Basic Pilot Program, the process and the burden of bringing a
qui tam action would be severely decreased and employers could more easily
defend such actions by mere participation in the Basic Pilot Program.
VIL Conclusion
Private enforcement allows legal enforcement without government
officials having to suffer the political wrath of appeasing competing interest
groups. In theory, civil RICO provided employees with the power to force
employers' compliance when the government was unable or unwilling to do so.
However, employees did so by embracing a theory of causation that is tenuous,
without a limiting principle, and which is presently inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent. Hencefar, lower courts have been unwilling to embrace the
narrowing of standing, but bringing suits that are contradictory to precedent is
not an efficient method to enforce immigration law. Nonetheless, the "private
attorney general" vision of RICO enforcement is not without advantages, and,
with proper congressional legislation, the strengths of civil RICO can be
maintained without civil RICO's threat of treble damages or the stigma of suit
under an organized crime statute.
274. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BASIC PILOT PROGRAM 2
(2004), http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/BasicFINALcongress0704.pdf (describing
an overview of the Basic Pilot Program); see also Manns, supra note 53, at 964-68 (discussing
the Basic Pilot Program).
275. See Manns, supra note 53, at 964-68 (describing the details of the Basic Pilot
Program).
276. Id.
1288
SYMPOSIUM

